> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://www.worldmonitor.app/docs/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Health Endpoints > Two health endpoints World Monitor exposes for monitoring data pipeline integrity — Edge Runtime handlers querying Upstash Redis for system state. ## `/api/health` Primary health endpoint. Checks all Redis-backed data keys and seed freshness metadata in a single pipeline call. **Authentication:** Compact health (`?compact=1`) is public for uptime and keyword monitors. Detailed health (`/api/health` without `compact=1`) and the operator history view (`?history=1`) require a valid operator/enterprise API key because they expose canonical Redis key names, record counts, and freshness thresholds. Browser origins must still pass the CORS allowlist in `api/_cors.js`; requests with no `Origin` header, such as server-side monitors, are allowed only for compact health unless they include an operator key. Health responses are never cached (`Cache-Control: private, no-store, max-age=0` and `CDN-Cache-Control: no-store`). **HTTP Method:** `GET` ### Query Parameters | Parameter | Values | Description | | --------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------------- | | `compact` | `1` | Omit per-key details; only return keys with problems | ### Response Status Codes | HTTP Status | Overall Status | Meaning | | ----------- | -------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `200` | `HEALTHY` | All checks OK, no warnings | | `200` | `WARNING` | Some keys stale or on-demand keys empty, but no critical failures | | `200` | `DEGRADED` | Critical keys empty, but ≤3% of all probed keys | | `200` | `UNHEALTHY` | Critical keys empty, >3% of all probed keys | | `401` | - | Detailed health or history requested without a valid operator/enterprise API key | | `503` | `REDIS_DOWN` | Could not connect to Redis — the **only** state that returns a non-200 code | > The overall health verdict lives in the JSON `status` field, not the HTTP code. Every state except `REDIS_DOWN` returns `200` so warn-level seed jitter doesn't flap HTTP-status monitors (see PR #2699). `REDIS_DOWN` returns `503` because with Redis unreachable the endpoint can assess nothing, so a plain HTTP probe must see a failure. ### Response Body ```json theme={null} { "status": "HEALTHY | WARNING | DEGRADED | UNHEALTHY | REDIS_DOWN", "summary": { "total": 194, "ok": 180, "warn": 5, "onDemandWarn": 9, "staleContent": 0, "crit": 0 }, "checkedAt": "2026-03-11T14:00:00.000Z", "checks": { "earthquakes": { "status": "OK", "records": 142, "seedAgeMin": 8, "maxStaleMin": 30 } } } ``` `summary` fields: `total` is one entry per probed key (currently \~194 and growing as panels are added). `warn` **excludes** on-demand-empty keys — those are surfaced separately as `onDemandWarn` so they don't drive the overall verdict to `WARNING`. `staleContent` is a **subset** of `warn` (fresh seeder but the upstream feed stopped advancing). Only `crit` (`EMPTY`/`EMPTY_DATA`) drives `DEGRADED`/`UNHEALTHY`. With `?compact=1`, the `checks` object is replaced by `problems` containing only non-OK keys. ### Key Classifications Keys are grouped into three tiers that determine alert severity: | Tier | Severity when empty | Description | | -------------- | -------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Bootstrap** | CRIT | Seeded data required at startup. Empty means the dashboard is missing critical data | | **Standalone** | CRIT (seeded) / WARN (on-demand) | Populated by seed loops or RPC handlers. On-demand keys are expected to be empty until first request | | **On-demand** | WARN | Populated lazily by RPC calls. Empty is normal if nobody has requested the data yet | ### Per-Key Statuses | Status | Severity | Meaning | | ------------------ | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `OK` | Green | Data present, seed fresh | | `OK_CASCADE` | Green | Key empty but a sibling in the cascade group has data (e.g., theater posture fallback chain) | | `NOT_CONFIGURED` | Green | An optional source adapter this deployment never supplied a credential for (producer wrote `sourceState: "unavailable"`, e.g. the Global Tenders SAM.gov adapter without `SAM_GOV_API_KEY`). Not a fault and not counted as a problem; flips to `OK` on the first run after the credential is added | | `SOURCE_BLOCKED` | Green | The Japan MOD adapter proved no transport path reaches the publisher while retaining fresh reviewed records — either an upstream HTTP 403 after a successful proxy CONNECT (`HTTP_403`), or a target-scoped proxy CONNECT refusal corroborated by a successful control tunnel (`PROXY_TARGET_FORBIDDEN`). Uncorroborated CONNECT refusals, stale, empty, or unreviewed states still fail closed | | `STALE_SEED` | Warn | Data present but `seed-meta` age exceeds `maxStaleMin` | | `STALE_CONTENT` | Warn | Seeder is fresh but the upstream content stopped advancing (frozen feed); counted in `summary.staleContent` | | `COVERAGE_PARTIAL` | Warn | Aggregate records or a required subgroup is below the key's declared coverage floor (for example, 139/174 PortWatch countries or an empty prediction-market pool) | | `SEED_ERROR` | Warn | `seed-meta` reports `status: "error"` from the last seed run | | `REDIS_PARTIAL` | Warn | A single per-command Redis error on this key's STRLEN/GET (not a full outage) | | `EMPTY_ON_DEMAND` | Warn | On-demand key has no data yet (expected until first request); counted in `summary.onDemandWarn` | | `EMPTY` | Crit | Bootstrap or seeded standalone key has no data | | `EMPTY_DATA` | Crit | Key exists but contains zero records (and 0 is not a valid state for it) | ### China Coverage Projection `chinaCoverage` projects the hourly Railway summary at `health:china-coverage:v1`. The evaluator checks each launched China contract for both a fresh producer heartbeat and fresh, substantive China content; a fresh seed cannot hide stale or missing source content. `CHINA_DEGRADED` is a warning projection for partial or stale coverage, while `CHINA_UNAVAILABLE` is critical when the summary is invalid or the launched content is unavailable. The final public composition is monitored separately as `chinaDecisionSignals`. Its canonical payload must contain all six stable groups even when individual groups are explicitly unavailable. Health requires six group records and a seed no older than 60 minutes. Per-source transport details for policy, exchanges, and cross-Strait publishers remain visible only in this authenticated operator view; they are not copied into the public country summary or Pro MCP result. Blocked China contracts remain visible in the audit with their stable reason code but are excluded from the strict launched-entry health count. The launched cross-Strait activity contract audits the durable archive `military:cross-strait-activity:v1` independently for producer transport and latest Taiwan MND reporting-window freshness. A fresh seed with a stale official report therefore remains degraded. Japan Joint Staff reviewed observations are regional augmentation and do not satisfy the Taiwan MND content requirement. `/api/health` separately monitors `military:cross-strait-activity-bootstrap:v1`; fresh canonical data cannot hide a missing compact UI projection. It also exposes dedicated MND and Japan Joint Staff transport records. Japan Joint Staff alone reports `SOURCE_BLOCKED`, and only when retained reviewed records exist and one of two evidenced conditions holds. `HTTP_403` means the direct request and an upstream response received after a successful proxy CONNECT both returned HTTP 403 — the publisher itself refused both paths. `PROXY_TARGET_FORBIDDEN` means the direct request returned HTTP 403 and the proxy refused CONNECT for the target *while a control CONNECT to a different contracted host succeeded in the same run through the same credentials* — the proxy provider forbids this destination specifically, so no configured transport path exists. An uncorroborated CONNECT refusal, a control tunnel that also fails, `PROXY_AUTH_FAILED`, stale metadata, a missing source record, or any other source using the blocked state still fail closed through the existing `STALE_SEED`, `EMPTY`, or `SEED_ERROR` statuses. The distinction matters operationally: `PROXY_TARGET_FORBIDDEN` is durable and needs a different egress to change, whereas a bare CONNECT refusal is a proxy fault to remediate. Other current fetch failures report `SEED_ERROR` while the last-good archive remains available. The bundle freshness gate advances only after the archive, projection, and both source-health records publish successfully. The public bootstrap retains the bounded reason codes used for disclosure but omits proxy response diagnostics; full sanitized diagnostics remain in the authenticated operator source record. Operators can obtain the same sanitized, read-only audit with `node scripts/audit-china-coverage.mjs --json`; add `--strict` to return a nonzero exit code unless every launched entry is healthy. The audit reads only the compact Redis contracts and emits status, age, and reason-code summaries— never credentials or raw upstream payloads. ### Cascade Groups Some keys use fallback chains. If any sibling has data, empty siblings report `OK_CASCADE`: * **Theater Posture:** `theaterPostureLive` -> `theaterPosture` (stale) -> `theaterPostureBackup` * **Military Flights:** `militaryFlights` -> `militaryFlightsStale` * **Displacement:** `displacement` (current UTC year) -> `displacementPrev` (prior year, covers the Jan-1 window before the new-year seed runs) `riskScores` is intentionally stricter than a raw feed heartbeat. Its `recordCount` is realtime signal-density coverage: the count of score-relevant Tier-1 conflict, news, and cyber signal families present during the CII refresh. The conflict family is satisfied by either the ACLED path or the UCDP event feed, matching the CII v8 scorer. When those feeds are reachable but quiet, `riskScores` can still report `COVERAGE_PARTIAL`; underlying feed freshness is tracked by the source-specific health entries where those feeds publish seed metadata. `portwatchPortActivity` also uses `minRecordCount`. A fresh `seed-meta:supply_chain:portwatch-ports` record below 174 countries reports `COVERAGE_PARTIAL` instead of `OK`; partial runs may still refresh per-country PortWatch cache entries, but the canonical country list and healthy seed-meta signal do not advance until full 174-country coverage returns. `predictionMarkets` also requires at least one published market in each `geopolitical`, `tech`, and `finance` pool. Its seed metadata publishes `poolCounts`; missing, malformed, or under-floor counts report `COVERAGE_PARTIAL` even when the aggregate market count is healthy. ### Staleness Thresholds (maxStaleMin) Selected thresholds from `SEED_META`: | Domain | Max Stale (min) | Notes | | ----------------------------------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------------ | | Market quotes, crypto, sectors, earthquakes, insights | 30 | High-frequency relay loops / critical event data | | Military flights | 30 | Near-real-time tracking | | Predictions, flight delays (FAA) | 90 | Polymarket / airport snapshots | | Unrest | 120 | 45min cron, 2h grace | | Cyber threats | 240 | APT data updated less frequently | | Wildfires | 360 | FIRMS NRT accumulates over hours | | Climate anomalies | 540 | 3h cron, 3× cadence | | BIS extended, World Bank, IMF | 2160-100800 | Institutional data, weekly/monthly/annual | > These are illustrative; `SEED_META` in `api/health.js` is the source of truth and each entry documents its own cadence rationale. ### Example Requests ```bash theme={null} # Full health check (requires an operator API key) curl -s https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/health \ -H "X-WorldMonitor-Key: $WORLDMONITOR_API_KEY" | jq . # Compact (problems only) curl -s "https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/health?compact=1" | jq . # UptimeRobot / monitoring: check HTTP status code curl -o /dev/null -s -w "%{http_code}" "https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/health?compact=1" # Returns 503 only when Redis is unreachable (REDIS_DOWN); 200 for every other # state — the verdict (HEALTHY/WARNING/DEGRADED/UNHEALTHY) is in the body's `status`. ``` ## `/api/seed-health` Focused endpoint for seed loop freshness. Checks only `seed-meta:*` keys without fetching actual data payloads. **Authentication:** Requires valid API key or allowed origin. **HTTP Method:** `GET` ### Response Status Codes | HTTP Status | Overall Status | Meaning | | ----------- | -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `200` | `healthy` | All seed loops reporting on time | | `200` | `warning` | Some seeds stale (age > 2x interval) or below a declared coverage floor | | `200` | `degraded` | Some seeds missing entirely | | `401` | - | Invalid or missing API key | | `503` | - | Redis unavailable | ### Response Body ```json theme={null} { "overall": "healthy | warning | degraded", "checkedAt": 1710158400000, "seeds": { "seismology:earthquakes": { "status": "ok", "fetchedAt": 1710158100000, "recordCount": 142, "sourceVersion": null, "ageMinutes": 5, "stale": false }, "market:stocks": { "status": "stale", "fetchedAt": 1710150000000, "recordCount": 85, "sourceVersion": null, "ageMinutes": 140, "stale": true }, "supply_chain:portwatch-ports": { "status": "coverage_partial", "fetchedAt": 1710158100000, "recordCount": 139, "minRecordCount": 174, "sourceVersion": null, "ageMinutes": 5, "stale": true }, "prediction:markets": { "status": "coverage_partial", "fetchedAt": 1710158100000, "recordCount": 87, "poolCounts": { "geopolitical": 52, "tech": 0, "finance": 35 }, "minPoolCounts": { "geopolitical": 1, "tech": 1, "finance": 1 }, "coveragePartial": true, "sourceVersion": null, "ageMinutes": 5, "stale": false } } } ``` ### Staleness Logic A seed is considered stale when its age exceeds **2x the configured interval**. This accounts for normal jitter in cron/relay timing. Seeds below an aggregate `minRecordCount` report `coverage_partial` and `stale: true`. Seeds below a subgroup floor such as prediction-market `minPoolCounts` also report `coverage_partial`, but retain `stale: false` while their producer heartbeat remains fresh so freshness and coverage stay distinct. **Consumers:** treat `status` and `overall` as authoritative for coverage. Do not rely on `stale` alone — pool shortfalls keep `stale: false` by design. When either coverage floor fails, the entry also sets `coveragePartial: true` so clients that only inspect booleans still see the shortfall. | Domain | Interval (min) | Stale After (min) | | ------------------------------------- | -------------- | ----------------- | | Predictions, military flights | 8 | 16 | | Market quotes, earthquakes, unrest | 15 | 30 | | ETF flows, stablecoins, chokepoints | 30 | 60 | | Service statuses, spending, wildfires | 60 | 120 | | Shipping rates, satellites | 90-120 | 180-240 | | GPS jamming, displacement | 360 | 720 | | Iran events, UCDP | 210-5040 | 420-10080 | ### History ingestion (`intel-history:*`) Domains prefixed `intel-history:` do **not** describe a seeder's canonical publish. They track whether that collector's post-publish append to the historical intelligence store is still landing: | Domain | Tracks | | ---------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | | `intel-history:conflict:acled-intel` | history appends from `seed-conflict-intel` | | `intel-history:military:cross-strait-activity` | history appends from `seed-cross-strait-activity` | | `intel-history:energy:intelligence` | history appends from `seed-energy-intelligence` | The append is fail-open by design — the canonical publish has already committed when it runs, so a failure must never fail the run. That means the collector's own entry (`conflict:acled-intel`, …) stays `ok` while history silently stops accumulating. These entries are the separate signal: * `fetchedAt` is the last **healthy** append, never the last attempt. A run that reached the relay advances it; a run that delivered nothing (every chunk rejected, or the wall-clock budget died before the first request) does not. So a broken relay freezes it and the entry goes `stale` on the ordinary 2x-interval rule. * `status: "error"` means the append failed on two consecutive runs — or, on the very first tick, that a relay credential present during an earlier successful append has since been removed. * `lastErrorCode` names the cause when there is one: `http_401`, `budget_exhausted`, `all_chunks_failed`, `config_removed`, or a clamped error-class name. Absent when the ingest has never failed. * `status: "not_configured"` means this deployment has **never** had relay credentials. It is visible but never an alarm — no operator action clears it except provisioning the relay. Losing credentials after a successful append is not this state; it reports `error` with `lastErrorCode: "config_removed"`. * `recordCount` is the volume the relay accepted on the last successful append. Zero is valid: a run whose records were all deduped still proves the pipeline works. The richer per-run detail — `lastErrorReason`, `consecutiveFailures`, `missingConfig`, and the inserted/deduped/abandoned counts — is **not** returned by either endpoint. It lives in the Redis record `intel-history:ingest-health:::v1`, which the endpoints project from. A `stale` or `error` here alongside an `ok` collector means canonical data is fine and the history store is the thing to investigate. ### Example Request ```bash theme={null} curl -s https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/seed-health \ -H "Origin: https://worldmonitor.app" | jq . ``` ## Integration with Monitoring Tools ### UptimeRobot Use `/api/health?compact=1` as the public monitor URL. The HTTP status code only distinguishes a total Redis outage from everything else: * `503` = `REDIS_DOWN` (Redis unreachable — a true hard outage) * `200` = every other state, including `DEGRADED` and `UNHEALTHY` So an HTTP-status-only monitor catches a full backend outage but **not** degraded/unhealthy data. For those, add a keyword monitor. Point the keyword monitor at `https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/health?compact=1` and alert when the compact token `"status":"HEALTHY"` (no space after the colon) is **absent** from the response body. Compact mode serializes with no indentation, so this exact token is stable regardless of formatting. > The bare `/api/health` URL is now an operator view and returns `401` without an API key. Public monitoring should always use `?compact=1`. ### Custom Alerting Parse the JSON response to build granular alerts: ```bash theme={null} # Alert on any critical keys STATUS=$(curl -s "https://api.worldmonitor.app/api/health?compact=1") CRIT=$(echo "$STATUS" | jq '.summary.crit') if [ "$CRIT" -gt 0 ]; then echo "CRITICAL: $CRIT data keys empty" echo "$STATUS" | jq '.problems' fi ``` ## Differences Between Endpoints | Aspect | `/api/health` | `/api/seed-health` | | ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------- | | **Scope** | Data keys + seed metadata | Seed metadata only | | **Auth** | None (public) | API key or allowed origin | | **Data fetched** | Full Redis values (to count records) | Only `seed-meta:*` keys | | **HTTP 503** | Only `REDIS_DOWN` (DEGRADED/UNHEALTHY return 200) | No (always 200 unless Redis down) | | **Best for** | Uptime monitoring, dashboard health | Debugging seed loop issues | | **Response size** | Larger (\~194 keys with record counts) | Smaller (seed-meta domains only) |